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This study  examines  the  impact  of  individually  oriented,  purely  altruistic,  and  a hybrid of competitive
and  cooperative  monetary  reward  incentives  on  older  adults’  completion  of  cognitive  exercises  and  cog-
nitive function.  We  ﬁnd  that  all three  incentive  structures  approximately  double  the  number  of exercises
completed  during  the  six-week  active  experimental  period  relative  to  a no  incentive  control  condition.
However,  the altruistic  and  cooperative/competitive  incentives  led  to different  patterns  of participation,
with  signiﬁcantly  higher  inter-partner  correlations  in  utilization  of  the software,  as  well  as  greater  per-
sistence  once  incentives  were  removed.  Provision  of all incentives  signiﬁcantly  improved  performance
on  the  incentivized  exercises.  However,  results  of  an  independent  cognitive  testing  battery  suggest  no
generalizable  gains  in cognitive  function  resulted  from  the  training.
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. Introduction
With a rapidly aging United States population, cognitive decline
s a substantial concern both in terms of population health and
ealthcare costs. In recent years, Alzheimer’s disease has become
he sixth most prevalent cause of death in the United States,
ccounting for an estimated direct cost of care of approximately
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/).$150 billion per year (Mebane-Sims, 2009). Further, much of
the cost of overall age-related cognitive decline is a result of
milder forms of decline. By the sixth decade of life, losses in
domains including reaction time, working memory, and attention
are widespread (Bäckman et al., 2006; Park and Payer, 2006; Rogers
and Fisk, 2006). These declines are associated with decrements in
functional performance on instrumental activities of daily living,
such as problem solving and ﬁnancial management (Marsiske and
Margrett, 2006; Finucane et al., 2005; Owsley et al., 2002).
As physical exercise can stave off some of the physical declines
associated with aging, it is possible that cognitive exercises can
reduce the rate of cognitive decline, promote healthy longevity,
and reduce healthcare costs. Despite this potential, research
examining the effectiveness of cognitive exercises in producing
functional improvement on daily tasks or capabilities beyond
performance on the exercises has generally been discouraging
(Jaeggi et al., 2008). However, these disappointing effects may
stem in part from low rates of adherence to training programs
and the lack of cost-effective approaches to improving sustained
and intensive adherence to these regimens. For example, the most
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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omprehensive test of cognitive exercises, the ACTIVE study, had
n overall budget of $15 million for 2802 enrolled participants, or
pproximately $5000 per participant over 24 months (Ball et al.,
002).
Individual monetary incentives have proven an effective moti-
ator to promote a variety of healthy behaviors including weight
oss, smoking cessation, adherence to medication regimens, and
hysical exercise in younger populations (e.g., Charness and
neezy, 2009; Perez et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2009; Cawley and
rice, 2011; John et al., 2011; Halpern et al., 2015). Yet, little is
nown about whether such incentives can effectively promote
ngagement with cognitive training among older populations who
ay  have different discount rates, beliefs about the costs and ben-
ﬁts of the training, and reasons to engage. Additionally, this line
f research faces concerns about the crowd-out of intrinsic moti-
ation to engage in healthy behaviors. One potential force which
ould act to counter-balance such effects are social motivations
uch as competition and reciprocity (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000;
enabou and Tirole, 2003; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). The impor-
ance of peer effects and social motivations in altering behavior has
een documented in a number of domains such as labor supply and
nancial decision making (Kaur et al., 2010, 2011; Bandiera et al.,
010; Duﬂo and Saez, 2003).
Social incentives may  also be of particular interest in the health
omain and among aging populations because many health behav-
ors (e.g. eating) have strong social elements and social ties remain
mportant throughout the lifespan (Lieberman, 2013). Although
vidence within the health domain is limited, two  recent studies
oauthored by two of the authors of this paper found beneﬁcial
ffects of social incentive programs. In the ﬁrst study, veterans
ith poorly managed diabetes were either paid direct incentives
or controlling their diabetes, or were paired with a peer-mentor
hose diabetes had been, but no longer was, poorly controlled.
lthough both interventions led to improvement, the peer mentor-
ng program was signiﬁcantly more successful at lower cost (Long
t al., 2012). In the second study, employees were given either
ndividualistic rewards or organized into small groups in which
oint rewards were allocated to group-members who lost weight.
hile the group incentive scheme was signiﬁcantly more effective
n motivating weight loss, it also provided higher rewards ex post,
o it failed to provide a clean comparison of social and non-social
ncentives of similar value (Kullgren et al., 2013). No studies that
e are aware of, including the two just noted, have systematically
ompared the impact of social and non-social incentives of similar
agnitude on desired health behaviors and, in particular, cognitive
raining among older adults.
Incentives that play on social motives could also potentially
nhance cost-effectiveness by providing motivation that is dispro-
ortionate to the underlying magnitude of objective incentives.
eople will, for example, often reciprocate small gifts, such as the
ddress labels provided by charities, or the ﬂowers handed out by
are Krishnas, with much larger return favors (Cialdini, 2006; Fehr
nd Gächter, 2000). Likewise, even in the absence of differential
aterial incentives, pure completion and the feelings of “winning”
r “losing” can substantially alter behavior and generate signiﬁcant
evels of effort (Delgado et al., 2008). The social forces generated by
eams or groups can also signiﬁcantly increase effort and reduce the
ost to produce a given amount of output (Nalbantian and Schotter,
997; Babcock et al., 2015). By playing on such non-pecuniary
otives, social incentives have, at least in theory, the potential to
roduce more substantial and long-run behavioral changes at lower
ost than individualistic incentives.Hence, this paper provides a test of the comparative effective-
ess of individualistic and socially oriented monetary incentives in
otivating online cognitive training via a randomized controlled
rial among 312 older adults. An online platform was chosen toconomics 44 (2015) 286–299 287
promote engagement with cognitive training due to three key ben-
eﬁts. First, and perhaps most importantly, use of a web-based
cognitive training task facilitates accurate, high frequency data
collection as well as high frequency feedback and incentive pro-
vision, features which are often difﬁcult to achieve in research of
this type. For example, studies examining the impact of incentives
on gym usage have generally focused on attendance, measured by
sign-ins; it is much more difﬁcult to monitor how much exercise
participants complete after signing in. Second, the online platform
provides an opportunity to examine the long run impacts of the
provision of incentives for cognitive training with minimal experi-
mental demand effects. In this study, for example, the active study
period in which incentives are provided lasted six weeks. However
participants were given one year of continued access to the cogni-
tive training exercises following the completion of the study, which
made it possible to track continued engagement with the exercises
after the removal of incentives.
Finally, beyond the beneﬁts of accurate measurement of adher-
ence over time, a desirable feature of an online intervention is that,
if found beneﬁcial, it would be much more easily scalable than
most other interventions which have been studied. Scalability is
facilitated due to the ease of replicating a web-based interven-
tion relative to interventions utilizing physical facilities and/or
personnel. More than two-thirds of adults in the United States
have a smart-phone, and older adults are using computers and
smart phones at ever increasing rates (Nielsen, 2014; United States
Census Bureau, 2013; Wagner et al., 2010; Zickuhr and Madden,
2012). Hence, these technologies have the potential to reach indi-
viduals of all ages and promote healthy habits, including both
cognitive training and other behaviors, on a daily basis at low cost
and in an automated fashion.
During the six-week active study period participants in all four
conditions, including the Control, were randomly paired and pro-
vided access to the cognitive training software including daily
information about the number of exercises completed (and, if rel-
evant, the earnings) by themselves and by their partner. While
access to the software was  free in all conditions, participants in the
Control condition did not receive monetary incentives for comple-
ting cognitive training exercises. Participants in the three treated
conditions were, however, eligible for additional incentives with
varying structures. In the individual incentives condition, referred
to as the Atomistic treatment, participants were provided with a
ﬂat payment per exercise. In the Altruistic treatment, individuals
were paid as a function of the number of exercises completed by
their partner. In the Cooperative/Competitive treatment, teams of
two were randomly paired to form quads, and each of the teams
was compensated as a positive function of the fraction of the exer-
cises completed by that team and negative function of the fraction
of the exercises completed by the opposing team. The magnitude
of the incentives provided in the three treatment conditions were
designed to be as similar as possible, so as to provide a clean test
of their relative effectiveness in motivating engagement with the
cognitive training. Further details regarding the exact payment
structures are provided in Section 2.4.
We ﬁnd that the use of any monetary incentives, whether
direct or socially motivated, approximately doubled engagement
with the cognitive training exercises. Surprisingly, Altruistic treat-
ment and Cooperative/Competitive treatment (both of which had
much lower average marginal beneﬁt per exercise to the individual
engaging in the exercise) generated gains in the number of exer-
cises completed that are statistically indistinguishable from those
in the Atomistic condition.Yet despite similar gains in exercises completed across
incentivized treatments, we observe very different patterns of
engagement in pairs of participants across the experimental
treatments. We  also found that utilization of the software led
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Table 1
Baseline participant characteristics.
All Control Atomistic Altruistic Cooperative/
Competitive
Current Population
Survey (CPS) (2015)
Age 64.76 65.11 64.85 64.88 64.48 67
(6.40) (6.74) (6.98) (6.16) (6.10)
Female 0.70  0.68 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.55
(0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.44) (0.47)
Married 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.52 0.69 0.62
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47)
Left  handed 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.20** 0.10 Not available
(0.33) (0.25) (0.34) (0.41) (0.31)
Not  born in US 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.12
(0.21) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18) (0.25)
Retired 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.60
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
White/Caucasian 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.85
(0.26) (0.32) (0.27) (0.27) (0.22)
Family member
has/had dementia
0.62 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.60 Not available
(0.70) (0.74) (0.70) (0.71) (0.67)
Normalized cognitive
test score at enrollment
107.32 106.81 107.49 107.47 107.41 Not available
(7.03) (7.45) (6.30) (7.48) (7.00)
Education
Less  than BA 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.68
BA  0.32 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.15
More  than BA 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.51 0.10
Other  0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.05 Not available
Median household income range (USD) 50,000–74,999 50,000–74,999 35,000–49,999 50,000–74,999 50,000–74,999 46,080
N  312 62 62 64 124
Notes: This table contains the mean and standard deviation of participant characteristics as reported at enrollment. Current Population Survey (CPS) data is approximate
based  upon the most relevant information available. Not being born in the US was proxied by being a naturalized citizen or not being a citizen. Being retired was proxied by
not  being in the labor force but also not being unemployed.
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iarize them with: (1) the cognitive exercise software, including
the exercises themselves, (2) the website’s messaging features** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
o substantial improvements on scores in the majority of the
ncentivized exercises, with greater gains among treated individ-
als. However, the gains did not typically generalize to broader
mprovements in measures of cognitive function as captured by
erformance on a validated cognitive testing battery examining
hree distinct domains of functioning as well as an overall global
easure of functioning.
Finally, to investigate the crowd-out of intrinsic motivation, we
xamine utilization of the training software following the comple-
ion of the experimental period. Despite dramatic declines across
ll experimental groups, there were signiﬁcant differences in the
ate of decline across conditions. During the ﬁve month follow up
eriod, roughly twice as many exercises were completed by par-
icipants in the socially oriented treatments than by participants in
he Atomistic and Control conditions.
. Experimental design
.1. Participants
Three hundred and twelve participants between the ages of
fty-ﬁve and eighty were recruited from adult education classes,
hurches, prior unrelated studies, Craig’s List, and community cen-
ers in Pittsburgh PA. All participants were screened either in
erson or by phone prior to entering the study. Individuals were
xcluded from the study if they had a history of stroke, dementia,
arkinson’s or Huntington’s Disease, Multiple Sclerosis, major psy-
hiatric disorders, or were using medications to enhance cognitive
bility. To participate in the study, individuals had to score at least
6 on the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status-40 (TICS-40)
roughly equivalent to scoring 27 or above on the Mini-Mental State
xam (MMSE) (Fong et al., 2009)], to have ﬂuent written and spoken
nglish, proﬁciency with a computer, internet access, and ability
o attend a training session and testing sessions at the beginningand end of the active experimental period in the ofﬁce in Pitts-
burgh, PA. These criteria were chosen to select individuals likely to
be invested in improving cognitive function, while preventing eth-
ical questions and attrition associated with enrolling participants
experiencing cognitive declines or in ill health. Baseline participant
characteristics are presented in Table 1.
With fewer than one in twenty signiﬁcant differences between
conditions, this table suggests that the randomization was  success-
ful in producing comparable samples in each of the four conditions.
The ﬁnal column of Table 1 presents comparable values from the
United States population during the same time period. Partici-
pants in this study were relatively representative of older adults
on many demographic characteristics such as age and retirement
status. However, participants in this study were, on average, more
educated (80% with a BA or more versus 25% in the population
at large) and higher earning (median income of $50,000–74,999
versus 46,080 in the population generally) (Current Population
Survey (CPS), 2015).
2.2. Experimental timeline and online platform
After being screened and completing the informed consent
process, participants visited the lab and completed an enroll-
ment survey and a 45-min baseline battery of computer-based
cognitive tests utilizing the NeuroTrax software1. Following the
cognitive testing, participants were randomly paired (and, when
relevant, grouped) and assigned to an experimental condition.
Participants also completed an in-person training session to famil-which allowed them to communicate directly with their partner(s),
1 Additional details regarding this testing battery are provided in Section 2.3.
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nd (3) the information available through the website (their per-
ormance, their partner’s performance, and, when relevant, each
erson’s earnings). Participants in the treatment groups were also
iven extensive instruction, in verbal, mathematical, and graph-
cal form, about the monetary incentive structure to which they
ere randomized. During the six-week study period all participants
eceived free access to the cognitive training software and daily
mails regarding their own and their partner’s/group’s engage-
ent. Earnings information was also provided in these emails for all
onditions except the Control. In addition, all participants, includ-
ng those in the Control group, could access information regarding
heir own use of the software as well as their partner’s use of the
oftware via the website at any time. This information was updated
n real time. At the end of the study period, participants completed
n alternate version of the cognitive testing battery completed at
ntake and an exit survey2. After the active study period all partic-
pants were given continued free access to the cognitive training
oftware, and usage was monitored; however no further emails
ere sent, no information about the partner’s utilization of the soft-
are was available, and no further payments were made for use of
he software. Fig. 1 details the participant timeline.
.3. Cognitive training and cognitive testing software
The exercises used in the training software were provided by
umosity, a ﬁrm that provides online cognitive training exercises.
he ﬁrm collaborates with cognitive science researchers from a
ariety of well-respected institutions in developing their training
xercises. The ﬁrm also collaborates with researchers to evaluate
heir training tools and has found some positive results. However,
he majority of the peer-reviewed evidence has focused on smaller
amples or speciﬁc populations such as chemotherapy treated can-
er survivors (e.g., Finn and McDonald, 2011; Kesler et al., 2013)3.
et, over 70 million individuals use this platform, and many other
latforms are also in use around the world. A better understand-
ng of the consequences of sustained training on these activities
mong a more typical population provides valuable information
2 The cognitive tests taken at enrollment and the completion of the active experi-
ental period are identical in nature and design, however the stimuli vary between
ersions to minimize test-retest effects. Correlation in performance across versions
s  very high (see the Neurotrax website for more details).
3 More information is available at www.lumosity.com.t timeline.
about whether these platforms can be used to improve cognitive
function or stave off cognitive decline.
A subset of 11 exercises drawn from Lumosity’s training mate-
rials were used in this study. These exercises targeted ﬁve primary
cognitive domains: spatial orientation, problem solving, memory,
executive function, and reaction time. The average exercise took
approximately 2 to 3 min  to complete; however the range in dura-
tion was approximately 1 to 10 min  depending on the exercise and
the individual’s skill level. To ensure that participants were exposed
to the full range of exercises, the eleven exercises were presented
in a quasi-random order which was  changed daily.
The cognitive testing battery used in this study was developed
by NeuroTrax and has been used in over 75 published peer-
reviewed studies. The battery been validated as a metric to detect
declines in cognitive function among both older adults and the
elderly (Dwolatzky et al., 2003; Doniger et al., 2006). It is able to
signiﬁcantly discriminate between healthy adults and those with
mild cognitive impairment. NeuroTrax discriminability is compa-
rable to traditional testing batteries in memory, attention, motor
skills, processing speed, executive function, visual spatial skills,
and problem solving. The test–retest reliability is also high: r = 0.84
for memory, r = 0.80 for executive function, r = 0.68 for Processing
Speed, and r = 0.79 for attention (Schweiger et al., 2003)4. These
features make it well suited to study potential changes in function-
ing resulting from the training regimen in our study. The testing
battery used in this study relied on nine tests focused on memory,
executive function, attention, and processing speed. While reaction
time is not considered a distinct domain in the NeuroTrax testing,
it is used as an underlying metric in processing speed and attention
tests. Due to time constraints during testing, tests explicitly target-
ing problem solving and spatial reasoning were omitted from the
battery.
After a participant completes the testing battery, the software
generates scores within each cognitive domain tested based on
performance metrics from the underlying tasks. Additionally, the
scores within each domain are averaged into a single “global” cog-
nitive score which serves as a measure of overall performance
on the battery. These scores are normalized according to age and
education speciﬁc values in cognitively healthy individuals. Fur-
ther details of this process are provided on the NeuroTrax website,
〈http://www.neurotrax.com〉.
4 More information is available at http://www.neurotrax.com.
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Table 2
Experimental conditions and payments.
Experimental condition Description Payment formula
Control No payment P1 = 0
P2 = 0
Atomistic Flat rate of $0.17 per exercise completed P1 = E1/6
P2 = E2/6
Altruistic Flat rate of $0.17 paid to partner for each
exercise completed
P1 = E2/6
P2 = E1/6
Cooperative/Competitive Marginal payments vary as a function of exercises by both P1 = P2 =
[(
Max [(E1 + E2) , (E3 + E4)]/6
)(
(E1 + E2)/ (E1 + E2 + E3 + E4)
)]
[( )( )]
N
2
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The increase in engagement in the treatment groups is statistically
indistinguishable across the three treatment arms, with an average
of 23.1, 22.4, and 25.5 exercises per day for the Atomistic, Altruistic,
6 Note that a marginal payment of $0.34 for the team as a whole is a marginal
payment of $0.17 for each member of the team. Marginal payments are high whenteams. Team members earn the same amount.
otes: Ex = exercises completed by partner x, Px = payment to partner x.
.4. Experimental treatments
Payment formulas for all experimental conditions are presented
n Table 2. Individuals assigned to the Control group were pro-
ided with free access to the cognitive training software, messaging
ervice to communicate with their partner, and emails, but were
ot given any monetary incentives to utilize the software. All other
onditions were provided with incentives to complete up to 30
xercises, or roughly 1 h of training, per day. An hour of training
as targeted to encourage a level of training high enough to detect
ffects on cognitive function, should one exist, while capping incen-
ivized involvement at a length of time judged to be potentially
ustainable5.
The maximum daily earnings in all treated conditions was $5.
his value was chosen primarily based on the values provided
n other studies which successfully promoted preventive health
ehaviors (e.g., see reviews by Marteau et al., 2009; DeFulio and
ilverman, 2012; Jeffery, 2012). However, given the range of pay-
ents proven successful in the literature and the variety of tasks
nvolved, some discretion was required. Hence, the total daily
ompensation of $5 was arrived at by balancing a level which partic-
pants were likely to ﬁnd motivating given the time commitment,
ut which could still be ﬁnancially sustainable in the context of
ellness programs.
Given the maximum payment of $5, participants in the Atom-
stic treatment were provided with a ﬂat rate monetary incentive
f approximately $0.17 per exercise for completing up to 30 exer-
ises. Participants in the Altruistic treatment were compensated at
he same rate of $0.17 per exercise. However, their compensation
epended on the number of exercises completed by their partner
ather than of their own level of participation. Hence, while partic-
pants in this treatment could potentially improve their cognitive
ealth via the training, they received no direct ﬁnancial beneﬁt
rom completing additional exercises.
Finally, participants in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment
ere paired with a partner to form a team, and two pairs/teams
ere matched to form a group of four. The incentives in this treat-
ent were designed to encourage cooperation between members
f the teams and competition between the teams. To accomplish
his, individuals in this treatment were compensated as a function
f both the relative level of participation between the two teams
nd the total number of exercises completed by the team with
he highest level of participation. Speciﬁcally, the total amount of
oney available to be distributed among the group of four was
5 Ball et al. (2002) present one of the few examples of a successful cognitive train-
ng  intervention in older adults. We base our estimated required training on this
xample. Training in this study consisted of 10 sessions lasting 60–75 min  con-
ucted over 5 to 6 weeks. However, participants in this study trained only one
ognitive domain. Participants in our study trained on multiple domains, with some
asks training multiple domains simultaneously. Hence, we targeted roughly similar
verall levels of training per domain.P3 = P4 = Max [(E1 + E2) , (E3 + E4)]/6 (E3 + E4)/ (E1 + E2 + E3 + E4)
the maximum number of exercises completed by either team mul-
tiplied by $0.34. The money was then allocated between the two
teams in direct proportion to the number of exercises completed
by each team. Each member of a team/pair received the same
compensation for a given day. This design provides a strictly pos-
itive marginal payment for the individual completing the activity
and also for their partner (up to the 30 exercise per participant
limit, consistent with the other treatments). However, the marginal
payment for one exercise by one member of the team varied signiﬁ-
cantly and ranged from less than $0.01 to $0.17 per partner based on
the performance of both teams6. Due to the fact that the payment
from each exercise is split between members of the team, individ-
uals in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment receive a weakly
lower payment per exercise for themselves than individuals in the
Atomistic treatment. But, to keep the total possible payments the
same, this difference is compensated for by the fact that when an
individual’s partner completes an exercise, that individual receives
a payment without having completed any exercises. This structure
encouraged cooperation among team members (each team mem-
ber’s work beneﬁts the other; both had to participate to get the
maximum possible earnings), but competition between the two
teams (once the maximum number of exercises was reached by
either team the payments became zero-sum across the group).
3. Results
3.1. Completion of exercises
There is a large main effect of treatment on engagement with
the cognitive exercises. Individuals in the no payment Control com-
pleted an average of 11.7 exercises per day (roughly 30 min  of
daily engagement with the software). Individuals in each of the
treatment groups completed approximately twice that number, a
large and statistically signiﬁcant increase (see Table 3 and Fig. 2)7.one team has not completed any exercises but the other team has not yet reached
the 30 exercise per participant limit so the total amount available is growing but is
only allocated to one team. On the other hand, marginal payments are low when one
team has completed the maximum incentivized number of exercises and the other
has  completed very few because the total amount to be distributed does not grow
when the low playing team engages, but the fraction reallocated toward the low
engagement team is small. Despite the variability in the marginal payments in this
condition, the median payment per exercise per team in this condition was $0.17.
7 As expected given the well-balanced randomization, results were qualitatively
similar with and without controlling for baseline characteristics. Hence, additional
covariates are omitted to simplify regression results. All regressions were clustered
at the level of the pair for the Control, Atomistic, and Altruistic conditions and
at  the level of the group (two teams each consisting of a pair) for the Coopera-
tive/Competitive condition.
H. Schoﬁeld et al. / Journal of Health E
Table  3
Exercises per day.
Atomistic 11.39***
(2.15)
Altruistic 10.70***
(2.55)
Cooperative/Competitive 13.76***
(1.68)
Constant 11.72***
(1.32)
R-squared 0.11
N 13,104
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression of the number of exercises completed
on indicator variables for each experimental condition. The unit of observation is
the participant-day. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the pair for all
experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at the level
of  the group.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Fig. 2. Mean number of cognitive exercises per day.
tomistic, and Cooperative/Competitive groups, respectively. This
esult is particularly striking given that participants in the Altruis-
ic and Cooperative/Competitive conditions received signiﬁcantly
ower direct beneﬁts for completing exercises than individuals in
he Atomistic treatment. Direct payments to the individual comple-
ing the exercise in the Atomistic condition strictly dominate those
f individuals in the Altruistic condition, who receive zero direct
eneﬁt, and weakly dominate those of individuals in the Coop-
rative/Competitive condition, who receive a median payment
oughly half as large as those in the Atomistic condition due to the
act that the same marginal payment in split across the members
f the team8.
Given that both frequency and intensity of exercise may  play
 role in generating improvements in cognitive function, we also
nvestigate the potential margins of adjustment underlying this
ramatic overall increase in the number of exercises completed to
etermine whether the incentives were effective at increasing both
hese margins. Reassuringly, the results indicate that the increase
s due to the combined effect of both extensive margin changes (i.e.
ore regular use of the software) and intensive margin changes
i.e. greater participation conditional on logging into the website).
8 While the marginal payment in the Cooperative/Competitive condition was vari-
ble, and depended on the level of utilization of both teams, the mean payment per
xercise per team ($0.23) was quite similar and the median payment per exercise
er team ($0.17) was nearly identical to the other compensated treatments. How-
ver, the fact that this total marginal payment is split equally across the members of
he  team results in direct payments to the individual completing the exercise about
alf  as large as those in the Atomistic condition.conomics 44 (2015) 286–299 291
Distributional information for the number of exercises completed
is presented in Table 4. Individuals in the Control group logged in
65.8 percent of the days while participants in the Altruistic, Atom-
istic, and Cooperative/Competitive groups logged on 81.0 percent,
80.3 percent, and 87.5 percent of the days, respectively. Conditional
on logging in and completing any exercises, the mean number of
exercises completed in each group was 17.8 (Control), 27.7 (Atom-
istic), 28.8 (Altruistic), and 29.1 (Cooperative/Competitive). Hence,
in addition to the large impact on daily use of the software, the
treatments dramatically increased the number of exercises com-
pleted once logged in.
As shown in Figs. 3a–d and Fig. 4, the higher average comple-
tion of exercises in the treatment groups is driven in large part
by the substantial fraction of individuals completing exactly the
maximum number of incentivized exercises, 30. While the most
immediately striking feature of these ﬁgures is the large mass
of individuals completing exactly 30 exercises in the treatment
groups, the treatments increased the number of individuals com-
pleting more than the monetarily incentivized number of activities.
Speciﬁcally, the treatment raised the fraction of participant-days
above 30 exercises from 9.0 percent in the Control group to 19.2
percent, 21.4 percent, and 28.7 percent of the Altruistic, Atomistic,
and Cooperative/Competitive groups, respectively.
Although the incentives offered in the three treatment groups
had similarly large main effects on the average number of exer-
cises completed per day, treatment assignments had differential
impacts on the within-pair patterns of engagement, varying in
accordance with the degree to which incentives depended on the
behavior of the person with whom the participant was paired. Indi-
viduals assigned to the Control group have no ﬁnancial interaction
or interdependency; however play between partners is still corre-
lated (r = 0.15, p = 0.09), providing evidence for modest peer effects
resulting purely from the daily emails regarding how many exer-
cises were completed by each member of the pair. In the Atomistic
treatment in which ﬁnancial rewards are again unrelated to the
partner’s engagement, the correlation between partner’s daily use
of the software is very similar (r = 0.12, p = 0.25). In the Altruistic
and Cooperative/Competitive treatments, however, in which ﬁnan-
cial rewards are contingent on one’s partner’s play, the correlation
between partners increases to 0.36 (p < 0.01) and 0.22 (p = 0.01),
respectively.
In addition to these simple correlations, a number of other inter-
esting patterns of concordance were generated by the social and
ﬁnancial incentives of the treatment arms. Column (1) of Table 5
displays results from a linear probability regression examining the
probability that an individual completes zero exercises as a func-
tion of their treatment group, binary variables indicating whether
their partner completed zero exercises that day or the previous
day, and treatment interacted with the binary variables. Column
(2) presents similar results with binary variables for completing
at least 30 exercises. Both the current day and lagged interaction
terms are strongly positive and signiﬁcant for the Altruistic condi-
tion indicating that individuals in this condition were more likely
than individuals in the Control group to complete zero (30 or more
exercises) if their partner did the same on either the current day or
the previous day. Of further interest is the fact that, for the Altruis-
tic treatment, the point estimate for lagged positive reciprocity is
substantially larger, although not statistically distinguishable from,
negative reciprocity. Negative reciprocity may  be mitigated by the
fact that the exercises are intended to promote health, encouraging
engagement even in the absence of ﬁnancial remuneration.
To further examine these spillovers and their evolution over
time, we  regress the number of exercises completed by the indi-
vidual on their partner’s exercise completion that day and the
previous three days as well as treatment assignment in a fully inter-
acted model. (See online Appendix A for regression, Table A1. Fig. 5
292 H. Schoﬁeld et al. / Journal of Health Economics 44 (2015) 286–299
Table 4
Summary statistics of daily completion of exercises.
Control Atomistic Altruistic Cooperative/Competitive
Percentile
10th 0 0 0 0
25th  0 10 10 21
50th  9 30 30 30
75th  20 30 30 31
90th  30 32 32 33
95th  35 35 37 37
99th  50 56 94 60
Mean  11.72 23.12 22.43 25.48
SD  12.67 15.03 17.65 12.86
Correlation with partner 0.15 0.12 0.36 0.22
Mean  percent of days logging on 65.78 80.30 80.92 87.50
Mean  exercises if exercises >0 17.82 28.79 27.72 29.14
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Fig. 3. Cognitive exercises p
ummarizes the results from this regression.) The point estimates
f all contemporaneous and lagged effects are positive and most are
igniﬁcantly different from zero. Initially (contemporaneous effects
nd one lag), reciprocity effects are greatest in the Altruistic con-
ition followed by the Cooperative/Competitive condition. By two
eriods (days) back, however, the effects are small and indistin-
uishable across conditions despite remaining positive.
Building on this analysis, we investigate these reciprocity effects
ver time in the study. Fig. 6, which displays the between-partner
orrelation in daily exercises by study week, shows that these
eciprocity effects grew stronger over the course of the six week
ntervention period in the Altruistic and Cooperative/Competitive
onditions in which payoffs were interdependent. In contrast, the
orrelation between partners’ play declined over time in the Con-
rol condition and remained fairly stable, but low, in the Atomistic
reatment condition.Exercises per day
 by experimental condition.
3.2. Performance on cognitive exercises
Participants in all experimental treatments signiﬁcantly
improved their performance on ten of the eleven cognitive exer-
cises included in the software (see Table 6, Panel A). Even in the
Control group, improvements in performance were substantial in
magnitude, typically between 3/4 and 1 standard deviation. The
doubling of exercises completed by individuals in the treatment
groups generated an additional marginal improvement of roughly
1/4 to 1/2 standard deviations on approximately half of the 11
exercises. The differential gains were largest in exercises focusing
on executive function, speed/reaction time, and spatial orientation
(Table 6 also indicates which exercises, numbered from 1 to 11, tar-
get each of the cognitive domains. Exercise 2 is co-categorized in
both Reaction Time and Spatial Reasoning. Fig. 7 presents these
changes in performance by cognitive domain). Although these
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Table  5
Probability of completing zero/more than thirty exercises.
Column 1
0 exercises
Column 2
≥30 exercises
Atomistic −0.17* Atomistic 0.46***
(0.07) (0.11)
Altruistic −0.24*** Altruistic 0.04
(0.07) (0.05)
Cooperative/Competitive −0.26*** Cooperative/Competitive 0.34***
(0.06) (0.09)
Partnert = 0 (binary) −0.06 Partnert ≥ 30 (binary) 0.08
(0.05) (0.04)
Atomistic × Partnert = 0 0.05 Atomistic × Partnert ≥ 30 0.00
(0.09) (0.08)
Altruistic × Partnert = 0 0.28*** Altruistic × Partnert ≥ 30 0.30***
(0.08) (0.06)
Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert = 0 0.18* Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert ≥ 30 0.11
(0.07) (0.07)
Partnert−1 = 0 (binary) −0.00 Partnert−1 ≥ 30 (binary) 0.03
(0.05) (0.06)
Atomistic × Partnert−1 = 0 0.05 Atomistic × Partnert−1 ≥ 30 0.03
(0.10) (0.10)
Altruistic × Partnert−1 = 0 0.17* Altruistic × Partnert−1 ≥ 30 0.32***
(0.08) (0.07)
Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert−1 = 0 0.08 Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert−1 ≥ 30 0.15
(0.07) (0.08)
Constant (Control) 0.36*** Constant (Control) 0.11***
(0.06) (0.03)
N  13,104 N 13,104
R2 0.07 R2 0.33
Notes: This table examines positive and negative reciprocity between partners (pairs in the Cooperative/Competitive condition) in each of the experimental conditions. Column
(1)  reports the results of a linear probability model regressing an indicator for whether an individual completes zero exercises on indicators for experimental condition, an
indicator for whether their partner completed zero exercises that day and whether their partner completed zero exercises the previous day, and those indicators interacted
with  each experimental treatment. Column (2) has the same general design but presents the probability of completing at least 30 exercises. The unit of observation is the
participant-day. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at the level of the group.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6
Changes in normalized scores on cognitive exercises.
Cognitive domain Spatial Executive function Memory Problem solving
Reaction time
Exercise number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Panel A
Treated 0.26* 0.45*** 0.31** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.07 −0.02 −0.04 −0.02 0.28*
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
Constant (Control) 1.08*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 1.06*** 1.13*** 0.74*** 0.07 0.42*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.79***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
N  294 293 294 294 293 294 293 293 293 294 292
R2 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.01
Panel  B
Treated −0.02 0.06 −0.08 −0.03 −0.12 0.00 −0.05 −0.13 −0.21** −0.26** −0.11
(0.15)  (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.17) (0.19) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14)
Total  Exercises
(00s)
0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.06** 0.08*** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Total  Exercises
(00s) Squared
−0.002*** −0.003*** −0.003** −0.003*** −0.004*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.003*** 0.001 −0.001** 0.002
(0.001)  (0.001) (.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant (Control) 0.71*** 0.44*** 0.29*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.34*** −0.15 0.16 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.28***
(0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14)
N  294 293 294 294 293 294 293 293 293 294 292
R2 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.12
Notes: Panel A reports results of OLS regressions of changes in scores on each cognitive exercise, as deﬁned below, on an indicator for “Treatment” which includes all individuals
in  the Atomistic, Altruistic, and Cooperative/Competitive conditions. Panel B contains the results of OLS regressions of the same dependent variable on an indicator for
treatment, the total exercises completed by each participant over the experimental period, and the square of that total. Scores for each exercise are normalized to a mean
of  zero and standard deviation of one. Changes are deﬁned as the last score–ﬁrst score, conditional on having completed an exercise at least twice during the experimental
period.  Results are qualitatively similar using averages of the last three scores–ﬁrst three scores. Results are also similar examining indicators for each treatment rather than
grouping all treatments together. The unit of observation is the participant. Although some exercises train multiple domains simultaneously, exercises are categorized into
primary cognitive domains as indicated by Lumosity, the company providing the software. Exercise number 2 has strong spatial reasoning and reaction time components
and  hence is included in both categories. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at
the  level of the group.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Fig. 5. Conditional correlations between partners.
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circumstances in which the exercises become much more taxing
as participants improve, there is evidence of substitution toward
9 For example, in column (9) each additional 100 exercises completed over the
course of the study increases average performance on the task by 0.05 standardFig. 6. Between partner correlation in exercises completed.
stimates suggest decreasing marginal returns to additional
xercises, the differential gains still represent substantial improve-
ents on these exercises for treated individuals.
The improvements in scores on the exercises are mediated by
he increase in the number of exercises completed (see Table 6,
anel B). Each additional 100 exercises is associated with a gain of
pproximately 0.05 to 0.2 standard deviations. However, congruent
ith the results presented in Panel A, the negative coefﬁcients on
he squared terms indicate diminishing marginal returns.
Given that the number of exercises (i.e. quantity) is incentivized
ather than the scores on the exercises (i.e. “quality”), it is pos-
ible the design of the incentives could encourage participants
o strategically substitute quantity of engagement for quality ofFig. 7. Mean normalized gains in exercise scores by cognitive domain.
engagement in order to maximize their rewards. If this substitution
occurred, it would limit the potential cognitive beneﬁts of training.
Table 6 Panel B allows us to examine whether this occurred by
testing whether receiving ﬁnancial incentives impacts scores on
the exercises, conditional on the number of exercises completed.
To be explicit, because improvements in scores are a function of
both practice (the number of exercises completed) and “quality”
or concentration per exercise, if treated individuals exerted less
cognitive effort per exercise we would expect treated individuals to
obtain lower scores conditional on the amount of practice (number
of exercises). Hence, if substitution from quality to quantity occurs
we would expect that the regression coefﬁcients on the Treatment
indicator to be negative.
As can be seen in Table 6 Panel B, nine of the eleven coefﬁcients
on the Treated variable are insigniﬁcant, suggesting no or min-
imal substitution toward quantity over “quality” of engagement
among those exercises. Two coefﬁcients [columns (9) and (10)]
are, however, statistically signiﬁcant and negative. These signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcients occur in exercises in which the duration of the
exercise increases substantially with improved performance.
Speciﬁcally, while the majority of exercises were of ﬁxed
duration, a small number of exercises increased in duration as per-
formance improved (e.g. a certain number of mistakes are granted
before the game ends, so as performance improves and the frac-
tion of rounds with a mistake declines, the duration of the game
increases). The games in Columns (9) and (10) exhibited this fea-
ture and ranged in duration from roughly 2 to 10 min  per exercise,
roughly 1 to 5 times the duration of a “typical” exercise. Hence,
the incentive to shift from quality to quantity on these exercises
was higher given the additional time costs of quality improvement.
Correspondingly, there is greater substitution away from quality on
these two  exercises. For these 2 exercises, the magnitude of the per-
formance decline driven by incentivizing quantity is approximately
equivalent to the expected decline in performance correspond-
ing to completing 9 to 10 fewer exercises per day9. In short, indeviations (the coefﬁcient on “Total exercises,” the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term
is  small enough not to exert substantial inﬂuence). Being treated with any incentives
decreases performance by −0.21 standard deviations (the coefﬁcient on “Treated”).
So, being treated is roughly equivalent to completing 400 fewer games over the 6
week study, or completing about 9.5 fewer games per day.
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period ended is relatively constant across experimental conditions,
ranging from 39 percent to 42 percent. However, approximately
7 percent of individuals continue to engage at meaningful levels
(>5 exercises per day on average) for at least a month, and 77
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.3. Performance on cognitive testing battery
Although individuals in the treatment groups typically had
reater improvement on scores on the training exercises, individ-
als in the incentive conditions did not show greater improvement
n scores on the cognitive testing battery over the course of the
ix-week study as compared with the Control group (see Table 7
anel A).
There are universal improvements, deﬁned as the difference
etween exit score and baseline score, across all experimental
roups in the cognitive testing battery10. However, as can be seen
n Table 7 Panel B, these improvements may  be at least partially
ue to a test–retest effect. While Processing Speed is signiﬁcantly
orrelated with the number of exercises completed even after a
onferroni correction, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between
he number of exercises completed and improvements on the cog-
itive testing battery for the overall cognitive score or three of the
our cognitive domains11.
An alternative explanation consistent with these results is that
ven the lower levels of training done by the Control group can
e highly efﬁcacious in increasing scores on this testing battery.
owever, the improvement of those individuals in the bottom
ecile of exercises per day (approximately 4 or fewer exercises
er day, or fewer than one exercise per day in each domain) is
tatistically indistinguishable from that of individuals in the top
ecile of exercises per day (more than 31 exercises per day). Hence,
he improvements from the training would need to be highly
on-linear (i.e. all of the beneﬁts accrue from the completing the
rst exercise or two) for this explanation to hold, suggesting that
 test–retest effect is the more likely explanation driving these
esults.
Finally, it is also possible that this particular cognitive assess-
ent failed to capture changes generated by the training or that
dditional training is necessary to detect effects on this test. How-
ver, the validation of the testing battery, as described in Section
.3, suggests this is also unlikely to fully explain these results.
ence, despite the fact that the incentives were effective in gener-
ting high levels of sustained engagement and substantial gains on
he trained exercises, these cognitive testing results are consistent
ith a large number of other studies which point to limited or no
mprovement on general cognitive tasks which are not speciﬁcally
rained (Jaeggi et al., 2008).
.4. Time trends
One of the most signiﬁcant challenges in changing health-
elated behaviors is to maintain the behavior changes over time.
uring the six weeks of the active study period there was a small
ut statistically signiﬁcant decline in the number of exercises com-
leted in the Control, Atomistic, and Altruistic conditions. The effect
mounted to a decline of approximately 3.3 exercises per day over
he course of six weeks, in a fairly linear trend of approximately
.5 exercise per week. There was no decline in engagement in the
ooperative/Competitive treatment (see Fig. 8).
At the conclusion of the six-week experimental period, partic-
pants were given continued access to the software; however the
onetary rewards and daily information about their own  and their
artner’s engagement with the software ceased. In contrast to the
10 Section 2.3 provides additional details regarding this cognitive testing battery.
11 Results of a two  stage least squares regression using treatment as an instrument
or  the number of exercises completed provide similar results.Altruistic Coop/Compet
Fig. 8. Mean exercises per day by treatment group.
moderate decline in engagement with the software during the six-
week experimental period (except in the Cooperative/Competitive
treatment), there was  a large and immediate decline in all experi-
mental conditions at the conclusion of the study. In fact, the average
total number of exercises completed per participant in the ﬁve
months following the completion of the study was only 84, or
approximately 0.5 exercise per day. This low level of engagement
is in sharp contrast to the previous overall average of 21.6 exercises
per day during the active experimental period.
However, a post-hoc analysis comparing the average number
of exercises between socially oriented and individually oriented
treatments reveals that individuals in the socially oriented incen-
tive conditions completed nearly twice as many exercises (103 in
Cooperative/Competitive and 98 in Altruistic) as individuals in the
individually oriented conditions (58 in Control and 57 in Atomistic).
The difference between the Cooperative/Competitive and Altruistic
treatments and the Atomistic and Control treatments is marginally
signiﬁcant (p = 0.06) during the ﬁrst month, but becomes insigniﬁ-
cant as the treatments converge over time (see Fig. 9).
The large standard errors on these estimates are due to sub-
stantial variation in the level of software utilization after the end
of the active experimental period. The fraction of individuals who
never log onto the software again after the active experimental0
1 4 8 12 16 20
Week Post Experimental Period
Control Altruistic
Atomistic Coop/Compet
Fig. 9. Post experimental period exercises.
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Table 7
Changes in NeuroTrax cognitive testing scores by domain.
Cognitive domain Global Memory Executive function Attention Processing speed
Panel A
Treated 0.03 −0.38 0.13 0.02 0.31
(0.76)  (0.95) (1.38) (0.99) (1.35)
Constant 4.29*** 2.38*** 2.80** 2.73*** 9.22***
(Control) (0.70) (0.83) (1.24) (0.91) (1.22)
N  310 310 310 310 308
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B
Total exercises
(00s)
0.06 −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.25***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Constant 3.81*** 2.16*** 2.78*** 2.81*** 7.16***
(0.62) (0.81) (1.02) (0.82) (1.01)
N  310 310 310 310 308
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Notes: This table reports on changes in the cognitive testing scores from enrollment to the end of the active experimental period. Each column in Panel A is an OLS regression of
the  change in score within the cognitive domain indicated at the top of each column on an indicator (Treated) for belonging to Atomistic, Altruistic, or Cooperative/Competitive
condition. The change in score is deﬁned as the normalized score at the end of the active experimental period score minus the normalized enrollment score. Panel B includes
OLS  regressions of the change in score on the total number of exercises completed by the participant during the active experimental period. The testing battery used in this
study  is a validated battery with high reliability. The battery, produced by NeuroTrax, is based on nine cognitive tests focused on memory, executive function, attention, and
processing speed. These underlying tests are used to produce aggregate performance metrics within a domain, as well as an overall “global” score which averages across the
domains being tested. While reaction time is not considered a distinct domain in the NeuroTrax testing, it is used as an underlying metric in processing speed and attention
tests.  Due to time constraints during testing, tests explicitly targeting problem solving and spatial reasoning were omitted from the battery. Additional information on the
testing battery is provided in Section 2.3 of the text. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which
is  clustered at the level of the group.
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ercent of these individuals are in the Cooperative/Competitive
nd Altruistic treatments, a pattern of difference that persists,
lbeit more weakly, after the ﬁrst month. Hence, these results sug-
est that the more socially oriented treatments enhance intrinsic
otivation more (or detract from it less) than more individually
riented treatments, at least for a subset of the population.
. Discussion
In this experiment, all three types of monetary incen-
ives, whether direct or socially motivated, approximately
oubled engagement with the cognitive training exercises.
trikingly, the altruistically motivated incentives and the Coop-
rative/Competitive incentives (both of which had much lower
verage marginal beneﬁt per exercise to the individual engaging in
he exercise) generated gains in the number of exercises completed
hat are statistically indistinguishable from the direct monetary
ncentives in the Atomistic condition. The dramatic increase in the
verage number of exercises completed each day was  the result of
ains on both the extensive and intensive margins, with individ-
als in the treatments logging in on a larger fraction of the days
nd completing more exercises conditional on logging in.
Despite the fact that the gains in utilization of the software
ere statistically indistinguishable across the incentivized treat-
ents, the patterns of engagement with the software among
aired participants were strikingly different across the experi-
ental treatments. While pairs of participants in the Control and
tomistic treatments exhibited modest correlations in exercises
ompleted each day, suggesting the existence of spillovers purely
rom the information provided about the partner’s use of the
oftware, the correlation between partners in the Altruistic and
ooperative/Competitive conditions was both much higher and
ncreased over time.The consistent and high levels of utilization of the software led
o meaningful improvements on the majority of the incentivized
xercises; these gains were typically 0.75 to 1 standard deviation in
he Control group and 1 to 1.5 standard deviations in the Treatmentgroups. Although there were also substantial gains on a cognitive
testing battery administered at enrollment and again at week six,
the gains did not differ substantially between Control and Treat-
ment groups or those in the top and bottom decile of exercise
completion, suggesting that the effects may  be driven primarily by
a test–retest effect. This ﬁnding, which is suggestive of limited gen-
eralizability of cognitive changes, is consistent with a wide range of
previous studies examining the impact of ‘brain exercises’ on gen-
eralized cognitive function despite the high levels of engagement
over the six-week training period in our study (Jaeggi et al., 2008).
Following the conclusion of the experimental period, utiliza-
tion of the software declined dramatically across all experimental
groups. However, the decline was attenuated slightly in the Altru-
istic and Cooperative/Competitive conditions. Individuals in these
groups completed nearly twice as many exercises in the ﬁrst month
following the cessation of the intervention as individuals in the
Control or Atomistic treatments. This result points to the possi-
bility that the social forces generated by those treatments led to
less crowding out, or more crowding in, of intrinsic motivation.
These differences between conditions in post-incentive engage-
ment, however, disappeared by the end of the second month
following the removal of incentives. Hence, although social forces
may  promote intrinsic motivation to engage with training, more
work is needed to understand how to amplify these effects and
increase their longevity.
Although the sample of 312 participants was moderate, the high
levels of utilization of the cognitive training software during the
study were striking and quite clearly robust. It is possible, with
a larger sample, that signiﬁcant differences might have emerged
between treatment groups, but our sample size was  chosen to be
large enough that clinically meaningful differences would be likely
to emerge. Indeed some differences, e.g., in relationships of engage-
ment between partners as well as differences in persistence once
incentives were removed, did emerge, and were signiﬁcant.While the population studied was  likely to be particularly moti-
vated, a fact demonstrated by the substantial utilization even
among individuals in the Control group, ﬁnancial and social incen-
tives still resulted in large increases in the number of exercises
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Table A1.
Table A1
Mean daily exercises as a function of partner’s lagged exercises.
Atomistic 10.62**
(3.82)
Altruistic 2.64
(4.38)
Cooperative/Competitive 8.73*
(3.56)
Partner’s exercises today (pt) 0.01
(0.05)
Atomistic × pt 0.03
(0.07)
Altruistic × pt 0.13*
(0.06)
Cooperative/Competitive × pt 0.06
(0.06)
Partner’s exercises t − 1 (pt−1) 0.06H. Schoﬁeld et al. / Journal of H
ompleted. The high initial motivation of the participants may
oderate generalizability of the magnitude of the effects; if these
ncentive conditions were implemented in a population that was
ot intrinsically motivated to do cognitive training, it is possible
hat the impact of the incentives would be more modest. However,
he opposite is also possible, since control participants in such an
mplementation would also be less motivated.
Additionally, the relatively high levels of education of the study
opulation may  also have inﬂuenced the participants’ reactions to
ncentives. However, the direction of this effect is also ambiguous.
t is possible that more educated individuals may  either be more
ttentive to or better understand the incentives or place a higher
alue on maintaining strong cognitive skills, leading them to react
ore strongly. On the other hand, it is also possible that people
ith greater education would believe there is less need to engage
n cognitive training, or that the high correlation between educa-
ion and lifetime income would moderate the impact of the modest
onetary rewards. Although this effect is ambiguous, the fact that
ncentives improved engagement from already high levels suggests
hat these types of socially oriented monetary incentives do have
he potential to promote engagement both with further studies of
lternative cognitive training methods and in those of other health
ehaviors.
The scalability of the online platform complements the scope
f the socially oriented interventions, both in terms of facilitating
urther research and in terms of possible use in wellness pro-
rams or other contexts in which healthy behavior changes are
romoted. From the perspective of study participants or individuals
onsidering whether or not to join a wellness program, web-based
latforms have the potential to greatly reduce costs and promote
ctive engagement.
Further, in terms of future research, the online platform,
nd in particular the cognitive training exercises, offer a unique
pportunity to gather accurate high frequency data with mini-
al  experimental demand. This feature is important for two  key
easons. First, although results of this training regimen did not gen-
ralize substantially over the period studied, research to determine
ow to forestall cognitive decline is still of paramount importance.
lzheimer’s disease is not only the sixth most common cause of
eath, but accounts for an estimated direct costs of care of approx-
mately $150 billion per year in the United States (Mebane-Sims,
009). Mild cognitive impairment and other less severe forms of
ognitive decline further add to this enormous cost and loss of
ealthy years of life. This burden will only increase with an aging
opulation. The total costs of dementia in the United States are
xpected to climb to between 300 billion and 615 billion by 2040
Hurd et al., 2013). Hence, while few cognitive training programs
o date have proven successful, further study of creative programs
esign to forestall these declines remains essential. This platform
nd similar incentives may  serve as an ideal venue for further study
n this area by promoting substantially higher rates of sustained
ngagement with alternative training regimens.
Second, and more broadly, although prior research examining
he impact of monetary incentives on other health-related behav-
ors has yielded a number of interesting ﬁndings, this research has
ften been stymied by poor measures of incentivized behaviors. For
xample, in studies examining monetary incentives for gym atten-
ance, attendance has been measured by card-swipes (e.g., Acland
nd Levy, 2015; Charness and Gneezy, 2009). However, it is unclear
hether the individual actually completed any exercise or simply
wiped the card to receive the promised rewards. A variety of other
ealth behaviors such as medication adherence face similar chal-
enges. Some studies have addressed behaviors with more directly
eriﬁable outcomes such as weight loss or smoking cessation, but
t is difﬁcult to measure these behaviors with high frequency and
ccuracy in many settings, limitations that likely diminish theconomics 44 (2015) 286–299 297
effectiveness of incentives. Online cognitive training addresses
these concerns by accurately capturing exactly how much exercise
was completed and by providing high frequency data that can be
used to provide rapid accurate feedback and incentives.
Although the positive, and generally comparable, effects of the
different incentive schemes on participant engagement might seem
to suggest that all that matters is whether engagement is incen-
tivized, the different patterns of engagement produced by the
various incentive schemes suggest that the incentive designs may
be more or less appropriate for different health related behaviors.
For example, in activities where individuals can “fall off the band-
wagon” easily, altruistic designs may  provide discouraging results
because when one team member fails and is unable to get back on
track there are likely to be negative spillovers to the other team
member. The same is true of the Cooperative/Competitive con-
dition. The higher correlation in behaviors between pairs in the
two conditions involving social incentives is, thus, a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, each of these conditions may  have been
successful in channeling powerful social motives to the goal of
motivating people to engage in cognitive exercises. On the other
hand, the same connectedness between the players also introduces
hazards in terms of likely non-engagement if one of the players
drops out. This could happen for reasons that have nothing to do
with lack of motivation, such as vacations, work, or lack of internet
access but nevertheless effectively demotivate the other member of
a pair. These are important factors to take into account when decid-
ing what types of incentives to introduce in a particular setting.
In sum, although the diverse incentive schemes examined in
this study were successful in substantially increasing older adults’
engagement with online cognitive exercises, and this engagement
produced signiﬁcant improvements in performance on the exer-
cises themselves, these improvements did not appear to generalize
beyond the incentivized exercises. While these results are disap-
pointing given the urgent need for strategies to forestall cognitive
decline in aging populations, the research does provide empirical
support for the efﬁcacy of ﬁnancial and social incentives in motivat-
ing engagement in health-promoting behaviors. If online cognitive
training regimens that confer generalized beneﬁts are developed in
the future, the ability to promote sustained and intensive engage-
ment with them will be crucial to realizing their full beneﬁts.(0.03)
Atomistic × pt−1 −0.05
(0.05)
Altruistic × pt−1 0.10
(0.06)
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Table A1 (Continued)
Cooperative/Competitive × pt−1 0.05
(0.04)
Partner’s exercises t − 2 (pt−2) 0.06*
(0.03)
Atomistic × pt−2 0.003
(0.05)
Altruistic × pt−2 0.02
(0.05)
Cooperative/Competitive × pt−2 0.008
(0.04)
Partner’s exercises t − 3 (pt−3) 0.091*
(0.04)
Atomistic × pt−3 −0.06
(0.05)
Altruistic × pt−3 0.00
(0.05)
Cooperative/Competitive × pt−3 −0.03
(0.05)
Constant 9.01***
(1.68)
R2 0.19
N  12,168
Notes: This table examines how an individual’s exercise completion relates to the
current and previous exercise completion of their partner (other pair in the Coop-
erative/Competitive treatment). The table reports results of an OLS regression of
exercises completed on indicators for experimental condition, the number of exer-
cises completed by the individual’s partner on the current day and three previous
days, and interactions between the treatments and the lagged exercise completion.
The unit of observation is the participant-day. Standard errors clustered at the level
of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is
clustered at the level of the group.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
R
A
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D* Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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